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Abstract Both the occurrence and behaviour of the Vaiont landslide
have not been satisfactorily explained previously because of difficul-
ties arising from the assumption that the failure surface was ‘chair’
shaped. It is now known that there was no ‘chair’, which means that
the 1963 landslide could not have been a reactivated ancient landslide
because the residual strength of the clay interbeds would have been
insufficient for stability prior to 1963. Furthermore, the moderately
translational geometry reduces the influence of reservoir-induced
groundwater and hence of submergence. Standard stability analyses
now show that prior to 1960, the average shear strength must have
significantly exceeded the peak shear strength of the clay interbeds
known to have formed the majority of the failure surface. Three-
dimensional stability analyses confirm these results and show that at
the time of the first significant movements in 1960, the rising reser-
voir level had a negligible effect on the Factor of Safety. According to
these results, the Vaiont landslide was most likely initiated by pore
water pressures associated with transient rainfall-induced ‘perched’
groundwater above the clay layers, in combination with a smaller
than hitherto assumed effect of reservoir impounding, then devel-
oped by brittle crack propagation within the clay beds, thus
displaying progressive failure. Further, very heavy rainfall accelerat-
ed the process, possibly due to reservoir-induced groundwater im-
peding drainage of the rainwater, until the limestone beds at the
northeast margin failed.With the shear strength suddenly reduced to
residual throughout, the entire mass was released and was able to
accelerate as observed.
Keywords Vaiont . Landslide . Geotechnics .
Limit equilibrium . Stability analysis . Reservoir effects
Introduction
The Vaiont landslide of 9 October 1963 was the most deadly and
devastating landslide ever recorded in Europe, causing around
2000 fatalities, mostly due to the destruction of the town of
Longarone in the Piave valley, northern Italy (Fig. 1). The occur-
rence of the disaster, and the events leading up to it, is well-
documented (Semenza 2001, 2010). Many attempts have been
made to explain the occurrence and behaviour of the landslide,
particularly the attainment by the moving mass of such a high
velocity (usually reported as around 25–30 m s−1: e.g. Müller 1964;
Romero and Molina 1974; Hendron and Patton 1985; Kilburn and
Petley 2003; Crosta et al. 2016). There has not yet been a single
explanation that can satisfactorily account for all of the known
evidence. A commemorative conference was held on the 50th
Anniversary of the event, in order to review and re-examine some
of the remaining technical questions (Genevois and Prestininzi
2013). Some results presented in the conference pre-empted part
of our work but our interpretations are new and, we believe,
significantly reposition the importance of the Vaiont landslide
for future hazard and risk assessments of proposed dam projects
in high mountain regions.
In a separate paper, we identified a scientific consensus regard-
ing the Vaiont landslide that appeared to be almost universally
accepted at the 50th Anniversary conference and beyond. This
consensus comprises four elements that are listed in Table 1.
However, following the presentation at the conference and subse-
quent publication of a newly derived map of the geometry of the
failure (Bistacchi et al. 2013) that corresponded with our own
developing hypothesis regarding the landslide, we sought to ex-
amine the implications of this with regard to the previous evidence
and interpretations published since 1963. Our review of the rele-
vant evidence, including detailed examination of the extensive
collection of photographs taken by Eduardo Semenza and col-
leagues in the years prior to 1963 (Masé et al. 2004) and of the
various interpretations of seismic (Caloi 1966), hydrogeological
and geotechnical (Müller 1964, 1968) monitoring data (e.g.
Semenza 2001, 2010 and references therein) revealed critical early
(mis)interpretations and oversights that allowed the consensus to
develop and consolidate (Dykes and Bromhead 2018). We also
proposed a new explanation for the geomorphological context of
the landslide that can account for all of the known evidence.
The underlying premise of this paper is that the failure surface
of the Vaiont landslide does not have a ‘chair’ shape (Dykes and
Bromhead 2018). The logical consequences of this are that the 1963
landslide could not have been a reactivation of an ancient land-
slide. Without a ‘chair’, back-analysis of the stability of the slope
yields peak, not residual, shear strength parameters. The residual
strength of the clay seams would have been insufficient to hold the
mass in place prior to 1963. Furthermore, the absence of a
subhorizontal basal part of the failure surface significantly reduces
the influence of reservoir-induced raised pore water pressures.
This leads to a new hypothesis for the Vaiont landslide comprising
four distinct but integrated elements that largely reject the con-
sensus view (Table 1). In this paper, we will apply routine geotech-
nical theory to the Vaiont landslide as defined geometrically by
Bistacchi et al. (2013) to test this hypothesis and, in doing so, to
provide an explanation for the landslide that can account for its
occurrence and behaviour and is consistent with all of the evi-
dence that we have been able to access.
Geology and the failure surface
Geology
The stratigraphy of the Vaiont landslide, which comprises a se-
quence of Jurassic-Cretaceous limestones of varying lithologies, is
summarised in Table 2. Hendron and Patton (1985) confirmed
both the presence and stratigraphic continuity of clay interbeds
within the Fonzaso and Calcare di Socchèr Formations,
particularly upwards from the basal failure surface within the
Fonzaso Formation. Failure occurred along many of the major
clay layers in different parts of the slope but Hendron and
Patton (1985, p.18) noted that ‘…at least one layer of clay occurred
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several metres above the surface of sliding of the 1963 slide. This
clay layer was thicker than any found at the base of the 1963 slide.’
The possibility of (perched) aquicludes within the landslide mass
must therefore be acknowledged.
The variable character of the internal geological structures of
the mountain slope and the landslide mass arises from a tectonic
history that produced, among other local features, complex inter-
ference patterns between the southern limb of the eastward-
plunging Erto Syncline and the steeply plunging Massalezza Syn-
cline (Massironi et al. 2013). The apparent ‘roughness’ of the
exposed failure surface reflects the accommodation of the tectonic
compression within the bedding sequence as well as some post-
1963 modifications due to stress relief, weathering and rockfalls
(Massironi et al. 2013; Wolter et al. 2014). However, a further
consequence is that some parts of the stratigraphy became locally
densely fractured, promoting preferential groundwater flow as
well as severely limiting the recovery of intact cores from bore-
holes drilled in 1960 (Hendron and Patton 1985).
The critical conclusions fromMassironi et al.’s study, consistent
with our own views, are that the tectonic movements and defor-
mations, across as well as along bedding, probably controlled and
even promoted formation of the failure surface along different
Fig. 1 Location of Longarone and the Vaiont landslide north of Venice (Venezia) in northern Italy. From Dykes and Bromhead (2018)
Table 1 Elements of the established consensus and the new hypothesis relating to the Vaiont landslide, showing reference codes used in this paper (from Dykes and
Bromhead—in press)
Ref. Element of the consensus Ref. Element of the new hypothesis
C1 The failure was a reactivation of an ancient landslide. H1 The 1963 landslide was a first-time failure.
C2 Both the prehistoric landslide and the 1963 landslide took
place along thin clay seams in a limestone mass and that
these were at, or near, residual strength prior to 1960.
H2 Failure took place along thin clay seams in a limestone mass
that were initially at peak strength.
C3 The shape of the sliding surface followed a folded rock
structure that comprised a subhorizontal lower part and a
steeply inclined upper part, commonly referred to in the
literature as a ‘chair’ shape.
H3 The sliding surface did not have a ‘chair’ shape but was
moderately translational.
C4 The trigger for the failure was a major loss in stability due to
inundation of the toe of the slide mass by the impounded
reservoir.
H4 The slope was geologically predisposed to fail but rainfall was
the main preparatory factor. Inundation of the toe was the
eventual trigger but this was probably insufficient on its
own, only being effective in concert with heavy rainfall.
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clay-rich beds within the stratigraphy, and that the highly variable
patterns of tectonic fracturing throughout the in situ rocks also
predisposed the northern slope of Mt. Toc to potential instability.
The development of the 1963 landslide and the form of its failure
surface can therefore be fully attributed to the inherent geology
(lithology and stratigraphy) and tectonic history of the site and it
can be described as a ‘bedding-controlled rockslide’ or indeed a
very large ‘dip-slope failure’.
Shape of the concealed failure surface
The Vaiont landslide is perhaps best known for its ‘chair’-shaped
failure surface in 2D cross-section, which has confounded investi-
gations into its occurrence for more than half a century (e.g.
Romero and Molina 1974; Hendron and Patton 1985; Nonveiller
1992; Pinyol and Alonso 2010; Paronuzzi and Bolla 2012). The
‘chair’ structure is associated with the eastward-dipping southern
limb of the Erto syncline. However, it was deformed by NE-SW
tectonic compression which formed the Massalezza syncline
(Massironi et al. 2013) and created a bowl-shaped 3D structure.
Bistacchi et al. (2013) presented a new 3D digital model of the
failure surface shape (Fig. 3) that confirmed our own early hypoth-
esis and partially verified some of the earliest post-failure accounts
(Kiersch 1964; Müller 1964, 1968; Broili 1967). The key elements are
the general eastward dip of up to 20° of the bedding within around
500 m of the gorge, and the consequent steep and most likely
stepped failure zone cutting through many of the stratigraphically
higher limestone beds near the eastern margin (although the
‘steps’ would hardly be visible on scaled cross-sections). The latter
provided a deep zone of high resistance to movement (e.g. east of
Bistacchi et al.’s profile ‘E’: Fig. 3), particularly in the lower eastern
side, that restricted movements here and gave rise to the observed
movement patterns elsewhere (Müller 1964).
Methodology
General approach
Analysis of the stability of a slope that has already failed, so-called
‘back analysis’, is a routine method for many landslide investiga-
tions that is often used to estimate mean mobilised values for the
shear strength of the failed slope at the instant of failure. This
approach to problems in geotechnical engineering has a long
pedigree and can be used with total stresses (Skempton 1948)
and effective stresses (e.g. Hutchinson 1969; Chandler 1977) al-
though the latter is preferred. Such static analyses require infor-
mation on the pre-failure geometry of the topographic surface,
sliding surface and any other relevant internal geological struc-
tures, the geotechnical properties of the materials involved includ-
ing density and shear strength, and the distribution and
magnitude of water pressures in the slope.
Most of the previously published quantitative analyses of the
stability of Mt. Toc have been ‘standard’ back analyses using limit
equilibrium approaches, although some researchers have utilised
kinematic simulations to investigate the landslide (e.g. Alonso and
Pinyol 2010; Havaej et al. 2015). We use limit equilibrium back
analyses as the framework for our arguments because, as explained
below, more sophisticated methods are not needed to explain the
Vaiont landslide given that there is no ‘chair’. Strictly, 3-dimensional
analyses are necessary to accommodate the bowl-shaped failure sur-
face that was indicated soon after the landslide occurred although
many studies have utilised more routine 2D analyses. The latter are
sufficient for us to demonstrate the critical arguments but we then use
3D results to verify our conclusions. We have used the Morgenstern-
Price method of analysis in 2D and a variant of Hungr’s method in 3D
(Bromhead 2004; Hungr 1987, 1989).
Geotechnical considerations
Limit equilibrium stability analyses calculate the ratios of ‘driving
forces’ (‘D’) to ‘resisting forces’ (‘R’) in order to obtain a Factor of
Safety, with the occurrence of movement resulting from the net
force, i.e. D – R. The landslide mass will accelerate if D > R and will
decelerate when D < R. If it is not moving, R ≥D. In a rotational
landslide, D will start to reduce immediately as the landslide starts
to move due to changing moments about the centre of rotation,
whereas in a translational landslide there is no such reduction due
to geometric change. At Vaiont, D > R must have been maintained
without significant reduction for at least 15 s in order to account
for the movement rate, at a shear strength half of that before the
onset of movement. This would suggest a dominantly translational
rather than rotational geometry, i.e. that there was no ‘chair’
structure.
Developing this argument further, we can use the ‘chair’ geom-
etry (i.e. a compound landslide comprising rotational and trans-
lational components) to discount several previously long-held
interpretations of the Vaiont landslide. If the landslide mass is
represented as two blocks as shown in Fig. 2a, a back-analysis gives
a shear strength of ϕ’ = 8–12° and c’ = 0, where ϕ’ is the effective
angle of internal friction and c’ is the effective cohesion. Such a
value can only correspond with the residual strength of a clay,
which would suggest that the 1963 landslide involved reactivation
of a much older pre-existing landslide. Without a ‘chair’, the back-
analysed shear strength is much higher.
If the landslide moves (Fig. 2b), Block 1 (i.e. all mass downslope
of the vertical hinge line) becomes larger and Block 2 becomes
smaller, which reduces D as in a rotational slide. The reservoir
level rises, which increases external resistance. Therefore, the net
force D – R starts to reduce almost immediately. Block 2 must also
get round the ‘corner’ (i.e. past the ‘hinge’ of the ‘chair’ shape),
which requires (i) a large-scale pre-existing internal rupture (rais-
ing further questions about how the original landslide may have
occurred) or (ii) substantial internal shearing which will take
energy out of the system due to the higher resulting R (e.g.
Romero and Molina 1974).
If the shear strength was initially at residual, the landslide mass
would have been approximately in equilibrium with the disturbing
Table 2 Indicative stratigraphy of the south side of the Vaiont valley (after
Bistacchi et al. 2013 and Ghirotti et al. 2013)
Age Stratigraphy Thickness
Palaeocene Scaglia Rossa ~ 300 m
Upper Cretaceous
Cretaceous Calcare di Socchèr
(or ‘Biancone Formation’)
150 m
Upper Jurassic Rosso Ammonitico 0–15 m
Fonzaso Formation 10–40 m
Middle Jurassic Vajont Limestone 350–450 m
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gravitational force and the observed acceleration would not have
been possible. Furthermore, there is now duplicate evidence of
retrogression of the heads of both sides of the 1963 landslide scar
(see BSecondary failures^ section). With reference to Fig. 2c, if the
top part of Block 2 is not included, there is insufficient mass on the
slope to overcome a even residual friction angle as low as ϕ’ = 9°.
In other words, if the landslide is ‘chair-shaped’, the top part of the
mass is essential if there is to be enough thrust to overcome the
resistance at the bottom (Block 1 plus external water).
If the landslide has a translational geometry and the relative
pore pressure distribution of Fig. 2d, the local Factor of Safety is
lowest in the middle part and the bottom must move with the
middle if it fails, but the top may be left behind due to the local
Factor of Safety increasing upslope. This is because pore water
pressures would normally be higher in the lower parts of the slope
due to downslope seepage contributing to a higher (or even
perched) water table (Fig. 2d).
Therefore, if the 1963 landslide was a first-time failure, the
higher ϕ’ implied by the back-analysis must have represented
the peak strength. Consequently, the shear strength reduction of
the clay layers from peak to residual is sufficient to produce the
conditions required to account for the rapid acceleration and large
displacement of the unstable mass. Thus, if there is no (or very
little) ‘chair’, the whole of the 1963 failure cannot have been an
ancient landslide because the mass could not have remained in
place until 1963 at residual strength. The consensus position there-
fore cannot account for the occurrence, acceleration or retrogres-
sive development of the landslide.
Finally, the consensus position also cannot fully account for the
observed patterns of movement of the landslide. Rates of ground
movement correlated strongly with rainfall irrespective of reser-
voir level (Müller 1964; Hendron and Patton 1985) but there is no
evidence of artesian groundwater below the clay layers that gave
rise to the failure surface (Dykes and Bromhead 2018). Indeed, it
now appears that the landslide was underdrained and probably
largely devoid of significant water pressures except following pe-
riods of very heavy rainfall when transient perched water tables
may have formed above the clay layers. This is the only reasonable
explanation for the observed correlation of measured movement
rates with rainfall throughout 1960–1963. Limited data from three
piezometers (Müller 1964; Hendron and Patton 1985; Dykes and
Bromhead 2018) show that the limestones above and below the
clay layers responded to rainfall and to external reservoir water
very quickly. Unfortunately, there are no data that can provide any
evidence for the perched water tables within the landslide mass or
for the impacts of reservoir impoundment on them, but reference
base-line conditions can be reasonably assumed (BPore pressure
assumptions^ section).
Pore pressure assumptions
The pore water pressures acting on the failure surface at the
time of failure are unknown, although they were most likely
hydrostatic pressures below a transient perched water table
contained entirely within the landslide mass. Because the land-
slide appears to have been underdrained and may therefore
have been mostly devoid of significant water pressures for much
of the time (Dykes and Bromhead 2018), we started by back-
analysing a completely dry slope. In any case, this produces a
minimum possible value for the required minimum friction
angle along the slip surface on which we base our conclusions.
It is inconceivable that there were no pore pressures within the
landslide at the time of failure. Indeed, we must infer that there
were possibly significant raised pore pressures for short periods
of time following heavy rainfall. If such transient water pressure
conditions did arise, then the effective stresses would have been
correspondingly lower, so that the computed angle of shearing
resistance must be higher than calculated with the zero pore
water pressure assumption. The shear stress is unaffected by the
pore pressure assumptions in the analysis as it is a function
only of geometry and unit weight.
Fig. 2 Slope stability principles that negate the ‘chair’ hypothesis. a Simple representation of the problem with a ‘chair’ structure. b Internal and external changes
affecting a hypothetical ‘chair’-shaped landslide. c Loss of driving force if the upper part of Block 2 is not included. d Simple representation of how the local Factor of
Safety varies along a translational landslide
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Analysis of the effects of part submergence seems, regrettably,
to be poorly understood, notwithstanding the publication by Bish-
op (1955) of a method of dealing with it. Matters are not helped by
the publication of completely wrong theories (e.g. De Mello et al.
2004). In essence, there are two competing effects: (i) external
loading on the lower part of the landslide surface, an effect that
always improves stability and therefore reduces the required shear
strength for equilibrium calculated in a back analysis; (ii) the
introduction or modification of water pressures in the slope
(Bromhead et al. 1999), which always reduces stability and there-
fore increases the calculated shear strength needed for equilibri-
um. It is therefore not possible to make a back analysis where the
slope is submerged and this is believed to be a factor in its
instability—and yet to neglect the (unknown) pore pressure effect.
A problem therefore arises: what was the initial pore pressure state
prior to submergence, and what effect does submergence have on
the pore pressure distribution? This is a case where the result
obtained is entirely dependent on the assumptions made. More-
over, the effect of pore water pressure on shear strength is some-
what dependent on the density of the soil or rock involved as the
higher the density, the smaller the effect of pore pressure, and vice
versa.
At Vaiont, if the piezometric line was higher than external
reservoir level before the toe of the landslide was submerged, then
the calculation always yields an improvement in stability because
the reservoir provided external support with no change to the
internal conditions. Conversely, the maximum negative effect from
submergence would have arisen from internal pore water pres-
sures increasing from zero to values associated with a horizontal
piezometric line at the level of the external water surface. Our
analysis assumes the latter case, which has a smaller effect in
practice and may be similar to actual conditions prior to the final
failure. However, the critical point is that that the pore water
pressure effect is significantly greater for an assumed ‘chair’
shape than it is for the moderately translational failure surface
established by Bistacchi et al. (2013). We do not consider the
effects of possible transient perched water tables affecting part
of the failure surface above the horizontal piezometric level. This
is not a limitation because to do so would merely reinforce key
parts of our arguments: we only need to show the minimum
friction angles needed for stability in order to substantiate our
case.
Input data
In the case of the Vaiont landslide, the pre-failure topography is
known in detail from the maps of Rossi and Semenza (1965) and
the failure surface geometry has been redefined by Bistacchi et al.
(2013). For both the west and east sides of the landslide, Bistacchi
et al. (2013) presented a representative longest cross-section
aligned with the corresponding theoretical direction of movement
(identified as ‘E’ and ‘W’). We have analysed these and parallel
sections at 200 m intervals laterally (Figs. 3 and 4). There are no
other constraining geological structures, the failure being mostly
defined by bedding structures approximately parallel to the failure
surface. We have also checked that these slope-parallel alignments
were not influencing results by also analysing North-South profiles
centred on the intersections of profiles W and E with the 800 m
contour (also indicated in Fig. 4), with a further overall check
being provided by the 3D analyses.
The assumed density of the rocks used in previous studies
varies (Table 3), and there is some uncertainty about the most
representative value. Limestone matrix is dominated by calcite
(specific gravity G = 2.71; γ = 26.6 kN m−3) but the matrix density
of a dolostone is slightly higher (G = 2.87; γ = 28.2 kN m−3)
(Doveton 1999). Clay layers at 18 kN m−3 will reduce the overall
rock mass unit weight by less than 0.5 kN m−3 (corresponding with
10% total volume of clay). The densely fractured nature of the
rocks at Vaiont will necessarily reduce the actual density by a
further very small fraction. Thus the landslide mass could have a
unit weight of up to 26 kN m−3 in theory, even with a very small
overall porosity, but the densely fractured mass and small volume
occupied by clay must reduce this value, and the range of typical
densities is almost always lower (Table 4). The value of rock
density/unit weight used in analyses with no water in the slopes
makes no difference to calculated shear strengths represented as
friction angles. However, if there is water in the slopes, then the
higher the density of the rock mass, the smaller are the relative
effects of pre-existing pore water pressures and both internal and
external effects from submergence of the slope. We have therefore
analysed the 2D profiles using γ = 20, 23 and 26 kN m−3 to cover
the range of possibilities.
Stability analyses
Firstly, we back-analysed 2D slope profiles using three unit weights
(γ = 20, 23 and 26 kN m−3):
1. For each unit weight, we determined the peak shear strength
mobilised along each profile (Fig. 4) at the point of failure at
FS = 1.0, represented as an (effective) angle of internal friction,
ϕp’, for (a) no water and (b) water table elevation = reservoir
level at 600, 650, 700 and 722.5 m. The 650-m level corresponds
with the end of the ‘first filling’ in November 1960, and 722.5 m
was the design top water level for the reservoir.
Fig. 3 Failure surface map with x-y axes in metres and contours at 50-m intervals,
showing lines of cross-sections analysed in this paper. The light blue line is E (N-S)
and the orange line is W (N-S). Failure surface contours and Sections ‘E’ and ‘W’
after Bistacchi et al. (2013)
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2. For each unit weight, we determined the FS of each profile
(Fig. 3) assuming ϕp’ = 30° throughout, for (a) no water and
(b) water table elevation = reservoir level = 600, 650, 700 and
722.5 m. The assumed value of ϕp’ has no bearing on these
results: the actual mobilised friction angle for each case, ϕ’m,
was not dependent on the assumed ϕp’.
3. For each unit weight, we determined the maximum reduction in
FS of each profile (Fig. 4), assuming ϕp’ = 30° throughout, from
‘no water’ to water table elevation = reservoir level = 722.5 m.
4. We examined the possible effect of the 1960 landslide on the
FS of 2D profiles W and W-200 by repeating step 2 (above)
for these profiles with the thickness of the 1960 landslide
removed.
Secondly, we performed 3D stability analyses. Using the same
source documents as for the cross-sections, the failure surface and
the pre-failure topography were specified as elevations at the
intersections of an arbitrarily-positioned 100 m × 100 m x-y grid
(as shown in Fig. 3), with the outline of the failed mass specified to
the nearest 25 m. We analysed the landslide to assess the degree of
variation of 2D results from the whole landslide condition, using
γ = 23 kN m−3, ϕp’ = 25° and no cohesion, for (a) a completely dry
slope and (b) water table elevation = reservoir level at 600, 650,
700 and 722.5 m. Finally, the actual ϕ’m for each case was
calculated and confirmed as being independent of the assumed
value for ϕp’, the latter having no bearing on these results.
Results
Results—mobilised friction angle
Results obtained from the 2D analyses are shown in Table 5 and
Figs. 5, 6, and 7. Table 5 shows the complete set of stress, friction
angle and stability values obtained for each profile for γ =
23 kN m−3, including north-south versions of profiles E and W.
All of these results (except for the N-S profiles) were also obtained
for γ = 20 and 26 kN m−3. Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the effects of
the unit weight, which can be seen to be negligible in terms of the
mobilised friction angle and very small in terms of Factor of Safety
(FS) reductions due to water tables resulting from toe inundation.
For the dry condition, the minimum angle of internal friction, ϕ’,
required for stability along each section is significantly higher
towards the eastern margin (Table 5; Fig. 5), and the western side
of the landslide was more sensitive to changing water levels than
the eastern side (Figs. 6 and 7). This is consistent with the recorded
observations of ground movements during 1960–63 that showed
movement rates to be highest in the lower part of the west side,
lower in the upper west side, much lower still in the upper east side
and minimal in the lower east side (Müller 1964). The friction
angles required for stability are lowest at profiles W + 400 and
W-400 (Fig. 5) because there is very little mass on the steeper
upper part of the failure surface. The landslide of November
1960 would have reduced the FS of profiles W and W-200 by no
more than 0.9 and 0.6% respectively (maximum changes for
completely dry slopes), i.e. increasing the friction angle required
for stability by around 0.1°. This represents at most a marginal
effect for each of these 2D profiles, so the effect on the overall
stability of the entire mountain slope must be considered negligi-
ble and need not be considered further.
The mean mobilised friction angle obtained from the analysed
profiles is ϕ’p = 22.0° for a completely dry slope and ϕ’p = 22.8°
with the water level at 722.5 m (c.f. Fig. 5). The peak friction angle
(ϕ’p) of clays such as those found within the Fonzaso Formation,
Fig. 4 Analysed 2D slope profiles through the Vaiont landslide (Fig. 3). Reservoir and groundwater elevations of 650 m and 722.5 m are shown for each profile. The
approximate position of the 1960 landslide (dashed line) is indicated on profiles W and W-200
Table 3 Published densities and unit weights assumed to apply to the Vaiont l-
andslide at the time of failure
Unit weight (kN m−3) Reference
26 (relative density = 2.65) Martinis (1978)
26.5 (relative density = 2.7) Anderson (1985)
23.5 Alonso and Pinyol (2010)
26.3–26.5 Superchi (2012)
24.5 Del Ventisette et al. (2015)
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no more than a few mm thick and interbedded with the lime-
stones, probably fall within the range ϕ’p = 22–26° found in clays
under normal stresses of 1–10 MPa, i.e. corresponding with the
Vaiont case (Petley 1999, cited in Kilburn and Petley 2003). The
higher friction angle required to maintain stability of the eastern
side was provided by the weak clay beds being buried to ever
increasing depths eastwards by the overlying younger limestones
and by the available strength across and through the bedding of
these younger rocks.
All of the 3D stability analyses showed the vector direction for
the minimum FS to be almost exactly due North. The first 3D
stability analysis of the entire landslide (γ = 23 kN m−3, ϕp’ = 25°)
gave FS = 1.03 (effective normal stress = 1969 kPa, shear stress =
895 kPa). For stability at FS = 1.0, the mobilised friction angle ϕ’ =
24.4°, higher than the indicative mean value obtained from the
separate 2D profile analyses but this must have been even higher to
resist the adverse effects of even the lowest reasonable
groundwater level and/or artesian pore water pressures
(Hendron and Patton 1985). Reduction of the friction angle to 12°
reduces the stability by half (FS = 0.5) and allows the observed
acceleration when the last intact limestone beds failed on 9 Octo-
ber 1963.
Results—effective stresses
The data recorded during 1960–1963 showed that from the start of
the second filling of the reservoir in October 1961, the piezometric
surfaces in three piezometers P1, P2 and P3 (Müller 1964; Hendron
and Patton 1985) rose gradually to meet the reservoir water level
after periods of time related to each piezometer’s distance
upslope—and up-dip—from the Vaiont gorge (Dykes and
Bromhead 2018). Thereafter, until the landslide occurred, they
matched the changing external reservoir level almost exactly. The
combined effect of the internal pore water pressures and the
external supporting load from the reservoir water was to reduce
Table 4 Derived unit weights of some Mesozoic limestones and dolostones (n.s. = not stated)
Limestone formation Dry–saturated unit weight (kN m−3) Reference
Triassic
Thaynes Limestone, Wyoming, USA 26.0–26.1 Manger (1963)
Ross Fork Limestone, Wyoming, USA 24.7–25.4
Muschelkalk, Mutzig, Germany 26.3–26.4
Muschelkalk, Galicia, Poland 24.1–25.4
Limestone (part dolomitic), Switzerland 26.2–26.5
Marble, Switzerland 25.9–26.2
Jurassic
Twin Creek Limestone, Wyoming, USA 27.0–27.0 Manger (1963)
Carmel formation (limestone), Utah, USA 26.0–26.2
Solenhofen Limestone, Germany 25.2–25.6
Limestone, Switzerland 25.8–26.1
25.2–25.8
Inferior oolite, England 22.9–24.1
Oolite, England 22.1–23.6
White Lias, England 23.9–24.8
Oolitic Jurassic limestone, England
(various different named quarried beds)
20.7–23.6—not stated NCS (2017)
OoliticBioclastic limestone, England 18.0—n.s.
19.6—n.s.
Middle Jurassic Oolitic Limestone from
the Bath Oolite Horizon, England
19.5—n.s.
20.9—n.s.
Portland limestone, England 24.9–25.8 Manger (1963)
Portland Base Bed limestone, England 21.0—n.s. BRE (1997)
Cretaceous
Caddo limestone, Texas, USA 25.3–25.7 Manger (1963)
Glen Rose Limestone, Texas, USA 21.7–23.2
Peterson Limestone, Wyoming, USA 24.0–24.9
Limestone, Switzerland 25.5–26.0
Mean: 23.5–25.6
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the overall FS of each cross-section profile as shown in Table 5 and
Figs. 4 and 6. The greatest reduction in the FS corresponded in all
cases with the highest water level analysed (i.e. the design reservoir
level at 722.5 m). The same pattern of results was found for the 3D
analyses of the entire landslide (Table 6). The critical pool level,
above which the FS would have started to increase with higher
water level due to the beneficial supporting effect of the reservoir
water, was found by Dedic (1987) for a ‘chair’-shaped failure
surface to vary between around 740 m and over 800 m depending
on antecedent rainfall (affecting artesian groundwater) and shear
strength used for his 3D analyses. We have not determined this
level for the actual failure surface but our results show that it was
never going to be attained, being higher than the maximum pos-
sible reservoir elevation.
The reductions in FS (Fig. 7, which includes results from
Table 6) are the maximum achievable for each water level eleva-
tion because the starting point is the limiting ‘least bad’ initial
condition and does not include the effects of heavy rainfall. There
will undoubtedly have been some pore water pressures within the
slope for some of the time resulting in the FS being slightly less
than the ‘dry slope’ case so that the reductions would be smaller in
reality. For the same reason the mobilised friction angle along each
of these profiles for FS = 1.0 must have exceeded that shown in
Table 5 and Fig. 5, or for the entire landslide must have exceeded
24.4° overall.
The much smaller reduction in FS at profile W-200 appears to
result from the much smaller extent of failure surface affected by
the reservoir-induced groundwater relative to the large overall
mass along this profile. Likewise, W + 400 showed a small im-
provement in stability (+ 0.5%) at the end of the ‘first filling’ due
to the very small zone of toe saturation to 650 m elevation com-
pared with the greater external depth of inundation below 650 m.
Analysis of the pore pressure coefficient
The actual pore water pressures at the time of failure are unknown.
Piezometers P1–P3 all showed a water table within the slope vary-
ing exactly with external reservoir level (Fig. 19 in Müller 1964),
although this was always below Bistacchi et al.’s (2013) failure
surface at P2 (Dykes and Bromhead 2018). The effect of this
condition on the stability of the slope can be argued theoretically
in order to further support our results using the pore pressure
coefficient ru, i.e. the ratio of the pore water pressure to the vertical
stress due to the slope mass:
ru ¼ u=γ z
where γ is the unit weight of the slope mass, z is the thickness of
the slope mass above the reference depth and u is the pore water
pressure:
u ¼ γw h
where γw is the unit weight of water and h is the water table height
above the reference depth. If γ = 20 (or 23) kN m−3 and γw = 10 kN
m−3, a piezometric line at ground level gives ru = 0.5 (or 0.426).
Therefore, a piezometric line halfway up from the failure surface to
the ground level gives ru = 0.25 (or 0.213). Applying this idea to the
northern slope of Mt. Toc for an example condition to demon-
strate the point, ru = 0.2 would require a mean ϕp’ = 38° forT
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stability, or c’ = 20% of the average shear stress—possibly more
than 200 kPa—or an intermediate combination of both. A higher
water table giving a higher ru would require even more extreme
shear strength values for stability to be maintained. Of course,
these theoretical conditions (Fig. 8) assume a water table between
the failure surface and the ground surface throughout the full
length of the landslide, whereas in reality only the lower part of
the failure surface saw large local increases in ru due to reservoir-
induced groundwater. A much thinner perched water table further
up the slope can be reasonably hypothesised, from previous argu-
ments, in the absence of any relevant data. However, the argument
for higher peak shear strengths than those in Table 5 and Fig. 6 is
further reinforced.
Our results therefore demonstrate several key features of the
Vaiont landslide:
1. Prior to 1960, the slope must have been controlled by peak
friction angles throughout.
2. The available friction angles must have been significantly
higher than our results indicate.
3. Limestone beds must have contributed to the available shear
strength until the final failure.
4. Progressive failure may have been initiated in late 1960 by the
extreme rainfall, the reservoir appearing to have an almost
negligible effect on the Factor of Safety at that stage.
Furthermore, all significant accelerations of ground movement
immediately followed periods of high rainfall, irrespective of res-
ervoir levels, but the reservoir may have impeded drainage of
perched groundwater that resulted from the rainfall.
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Fig. 5 Mobilised friction angle (c’ = 0) to maintain stability of each 2D profile for different unit weight assumptions (‘gamma’ = γ, kN m−3) under completely dry and
maximum inundation water table conditions
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Fig. 6 Reductions in the Factor of Safety from the dry slope condition at each 2D profile arising from different unit weight assumptions (‘gamma’ = γ, kN m−3) for ‘first
filling’ (i.e. 650 m) and maximum inundation (i.e. 722.5 m) water table elevations. The lines for γ = 23/26 kN m−3 at water level = 650 m were identical throughout (like
all lines for water = 650 m in the East side) so are shown as a single line here
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Discussion
The results of routine ‘limit equilibrium’ stability analyses of the
Vaiont landslide using the new failure surface geometry, combined
with basic geotechnical principles, allow us to invoke Occam’s
Razor in order to explain the entire event. The 1963 landslide
was a first-time moderately translational dip-slope rockslide that
was initiated by very high rainfall that happened to coincide with
particular phases of reservoir filling, then developed by progres-
sive failure of thin clay layers. When enough of the available shear
strength in the slope had been reduced from peak to residual, a
process possibly accelerated by the supposed effect of reservoir
water impeding drainage of further very high rainfall, the remain-
ing intact rock failed catastrophically and the entire mass was able
to accelerate and achieve the observed displacement within the
estimated 30–45 s. No other mechanisms are required and all
observed and recorded evidence relating to the site and the event
can be accounted for (Dykes and Bromhead 2018).
Ground model
The importance of an accurate ground model for any proposed
engineering project cannot be overstated. The new model of the
failure surface shows a gently curving bowl-shaped surface in 3D.
This overall form had been suggested as early as 1964 though with
more angular transitions between different segments of the surface
(Broili 1967). However, cross-sections drawn in the assumed di-
rection of movement tended to show the characteristic ‘chair’
shape of the failure surface that formed the basis of many of the
attempts to explain the landslide over subsequent decades. The
new cross-sections (Bistacchi et al. 2013) show some convexity of
the shear surface between the upper and lower parts but as a gentle
arc and not a tight ‘hinge’ (Fig. 4). Furthermore, the shear surface
always has at least a moderate gradient towards the gorge—and
there is no ‘chair’. This validates element H3 of our hypothesis
(Table 1). This failure surface geometry, combined with evidence of
the shear strength needing to be at its peak (intact) value prior to
the landslide (BStability analyses^ section), can account for the
observed rapid acceleration of the landslide. Cross-sections with
these characteristics had been presented by Kiersch (1964) but
were strongly argued to be incorrect by Müller (1968). Conse-
quently, such details, and particularly the three-dimensional char-
acteristics of the failure surface, may have been overlooked during
later investigations.
Stability analyses
The results of our new stability analyses lead to several fundamen-
tal revisions of our understanding of the 1963 landslide. An overall
friction angle of ϕp’ > 24° is needed for stability (FS ≥ 1.0) so the
mountain slope could not have remained in place prior to 1963 if
there was an old failure surface at residual strength. Therefore, the
landslide was not a reactivation of an ancient landslide, which
necessarily means that most of the northern side of Mt. Toc
comprised intact in-situ rock prior to this event. This is consistent
with explanations of the development of the landslide in terms of
fracture propagation (Havaej et al. 2015) including within clays at
high confining stresses (Kilburn and Petley 2003) and taking
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Fig. 7 Changes in the Factor of Safety from the dry slope condition, obtained from all 2D and 3D analyses assuming mean unit weight = 23 kN m−3, for water table
elevations coinciding with four external reservoir levels. There are no results for some combinations as shown in Table 5
Table 6 Results of the 3D analyses of the Vaiont landslide for various slope conditions with unit weight = 23 kN m−3
Factor of Safety using
ϕ’ = 25° throughout
% change from the dry slope FS
Dry slope 1.026 –
Reservoir at 600 m 1.023 − 0.28
Reservoir at 650 m 1.018 − 0.77
Reservoir at 700 m 0.995 − 3.03
Reservoir at 722.5 m 0.978 − 4.65
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account of the geological conditions generally throughout the rock
mass (Wolter et al. 2014). It also validates elements H1 and H2 of
our hypothesis (Table 1). Belloni and Stefani (1992) highlighted
Caloi’s (1966) seismic results as indicating essentially ‘in situ rock’
in 1959 with a deterioration in the quality of the rock mass between
1959 and 1960 due to ‘fracturing processes in the deeper lying rock
layers’ (Müller 1964, p.168). This is also consistent with the ac-
counts cited above.
Our interpretations are based on minimum shear strengths,
represented as friction angles, for a completely dry slope, so our
arguments are reinforced by the need for these to have been higher
in reality due to any water in the slope. Table 5 suggests that the
clay alone could have controlled the stability of the western side of
the landslide, given that the clay layers with relatively high mont-
morillonite contents (Hendron and Patton 1985) and very high
confining stresses (Kilburn and Petley 2003), probably had peak
friction angles around ϕp’ = 22–26°. Table 5 and Fig. 5 also show
that a much higher friction angle was required for stability of the
steeper eastern side of the landslide, but there was significantly
higher resistance towards the eastern margin due to the failure
surface having to rise through the limestone beds. Hendron and
Patton (1985) suggested ϕp’ = 36° for this zone, corresponding with
friction along limestone joints. Therefore, the minimum overall
friction angle of ϕp’ = 24.4° obtained from the first 3D analysis
must have been higher in reality, and individual 2D profiles must
have had more strength than indicated. The observed movements
of the slope indicated a coherent rigid mass above developing
shear surfaces, which means that the limestone beds were provid-
ing a significant proportion of the overall strength. The expected
50% reduction in the FS corresponding with the halving of the
friction angle from ϕp’ = 25° to ϕr’ = 12°, given that the driving
force is constant, was found from a further 3D analysis. It is the
sudden loss of the final elements of peak strength, probably closer
to the (lower) eastern margin, that ‘released’ the slope and allowed
it to accelerate.
Groundwater trigger
Movements of the northern slope of Mt. Toc began in late Sep-
tember 1960 during the ‘first filling’ of the reservoir (February to
November), which coincided with a period of unusually wet
weather (June to October). In late October 1960 (reservoir level
645 m), a 2-km long crack was discovered that defined the exact
outline of the eventual landslide. Filling continued until the
700,000 m3 landslide of 4 November 1960 occurred, at which time
the reservoir level (650 m) was below the toe of this landslide
(Semenza 2001, 2010). During 1–4 November 1960, the rate of
movement of the whole slope reduced, despite the increasing
reservoir level, because it had stopped raining (Müller 1964;
Hendron and Patton 1985). Hydrostatic water pressures due to
the impoundment were not significantly affecting the stability, as
shown also by the negligible FS reductions (mean < 1.0%) at 650 m
water level (Figs. 6 and 7; Table 6). The piezometer data (Müller
1964) show a water table at least 20 m below the failure surface,
meaning that the landslide mass was underdrained and not sub-
jected to artesian pressures from below (Dykes and Bromhead
2018). We therefore conclude that raised pore water pressures
within the landslide mass due to the exceptional rainfall (including
425 mm in October 1960: Müller 1964) probably initiated the
progressive failure leading to the 1963 landslide.
There are unfortunately no data that show any groundwater
conditions within the landslide mass. Field observations and bore-
hole cores indicated high overall permeabilities for the limestones
above and below the failure surface (Hendron and Patton 1985;
Semenza 2001, 2010) which allowed reservoir water to saturate the
entire slope to the external water level with minimal lag. This was
demonstrated clearly in the data once this level exceeded the
natural water table elevation at each piezometer. Such rapid re-
sponses at three locations across the slope indicate a rising (or
falling) horizontal water table throughout, as assumed for this
study. However, the extent, continuity and hydrological influence
of any clay layer(s) above the failure surface (see the BGeology and
the failure surface^ section) is unknown.
The ‘second filling’ of the reservoir, following construction of a
by-pass tunnel for any water trapped upstream of a possible
landslide, started in October 1961 and continued until a significant
acceleration of ground movements was observed at the start of
November 1962. Filling of the reservoir was halted and the level
was allowed to fall from its peak of 700 m; the rate of ground
movement steadily reduced concurrently. During late October/
early November 1962, rainfall of around 120 mm in 10 days was
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Fig. 8 Mobilised friction angles (assuming c’ = 0) for hypothetical pore water pressure conditions defined by the pore pressure ratio (‘ru’ = ru) from ru = 0 (dry slope
condition) to ru = 0.426 (water table at the ground surface for γ = 23 kN m
−3)
Original Paper
Landslides 15 & (2018)2012
followed by around 240 mm within the next 10 days. Piezometer
P2, furthest upslope, showed a 10 m piezometric rise above the
reservoir level but even this peaked around 15 m below the failure
surface (Dykes and Bromhead 2018). This demonstrates the pos-
sibility of a significant perched water table forming above the
failure surface from the same rainfall, promoting the accelerated
movement into December 1962.
The final acceleration of the landslide commenced in early
August 1963, immediately following around 200 mm of rain within
10 days. Further high rainfall (> 100 mm in each of the next two 10-
day periods) must have generated further raised pore pressures
from accumulated perched groundwater. The final failure was
therefore probably not caused directly by the filling of the reser-
voir, but by the presence of the reservoir impeding natural drain-
age of the perched groundwater. Tables 5 and 6 and Figs. 5, 6, and 7
demonstrate the very small influence of the reservoir on the
overall stability of the slope. The reduction in the FS must have
been less than 4.6% (Fig. 7) based on the 3D analyses because the
slope probably contained some groundwater initially. Further-
more, Kilburn and Petley (2003) showed that this final 60-day
phase of acceleration almost perfectly demonstrated the ‘Saito
effect’ (Saito 1965) of a linear decrease in the inverse-
deformation rate for progressive failures developing by brittle
crack formation. These observations and interpretations support
element H4 of our hypothesis (Table 1), although further model-
ling investigations of possible groundwater configurations are
required.
Secondary failures
Pore water pressure distributions associated with a near-
horizontal water table at the same elevation as the reservoir sur-
face could allow the main mass to tear away from the two heads of
the ‘M’ shape, a scenario impossible if the failure surface had a
‘chair’ shape (Fig. 2). Semenza (2001, 2010) highlighted a large
mass that slid from the head of the east side and over-ran the
main landslide deposit by up to 100 m. This mass, identified as the
‘eastern lobe’, retained its forest cover and therefore must have
fallen after the flood wave had subsided. Wolter et al. (2016)
showed that similar but smaller masses had likewise slipped from
the head of the west side and retained their trees intact, consistent
with a single photograph in the Vaiont-focused tourist visitor
centre in Erto that shows a more pronounced head scarp above
the west side in daylight (i.e. not earlier than the morning of 10
October). This duplicate evidence of retrogressive secondary fail-
ures some time after the main landslide further demonstrates the
impossibility of a ‘chair’-shaped failure surface (Fig. 2) and is
consistent with the more translational ground model discussed
in this paper.
Vaiont landslide explained
Once the Vaiont gorge had been cut by glacial meltwater by the
early Holocene, some form of large scale slope failure was inevi-
table. The Vaiont reservoir project may have very slightly acceler-
ated the onset of a particularly large failure of the northern slope
of Mt. Toc. Indeed, we have discussed evidence of past landslides
within or adjacent to the gorge, at least one of which blocked the
lower part of the gorge causing it to fill up with alluvial sediment
before a further landslide, triggered by rapid slope undercutting,
deposited the mass of rock known as the ‘Colle Isolato’ on top of
the infilled channel sediments (Dykes and Bromhead 2018; Wolter
et al. 2016).
Filling of the reservoir commenced in February 1960 and the
water level had reached almost 650 m by November 1960. Raised
pore water pressures within the slope above the Fonzaso Forma-
tion clay layers, due to percolation of exceptionally high
rainfall—possibly exacerbated very slightly by reservoir impound-
ment effects (Hendron and Patton 1985)—caused the initiation of
progressive failure within the mountain. The ‘M’-shaped crack was
discovered and monitoring was initiated in October, and although
no part of the 4 November landslide was ever influenced by the
reservoir (Semenza 2001, 2010), filling was stopped.
In these early stages, localised ‘brittle’ crack initiation and
propagation within clay layers commenced (Kilburn and Petley
2003; Havaej et al. 2015) with any initial displacements being taken
up by differential movement of limestone beds along or against
existing joints. As cracking and micro-shearing within the clays
progressed, the available shear strength started to fall locally,
mobilising additional shear strength in adjacent parts of the mass.
The November 1960 rockslide may have allowed new stress relief
joints to form but had little tangible effect on the overall stability
of Mt. Toc.
During the ‘first filling’ of the reservoir during 1960, the largest
velocities were recorded in the lower west side of the slope, with
movements above the Pozza being lower by about half. Velocities
were lower still in the upper east side, reducing towards the gorge
east of the Massalezza Ditch (Müller 1964). This pattern is consis-
tent with a down-dip (i.e. ENE) vector of shear stress on the failure
surface modifying the downslope trend, in which the lower west
side is entirely unsupported but the lower east side is supported
and resisted by the great thickness of intact beds stratigraphically
above the failure surface. This eastern margin of the unstable mass
was therefore affected by some component of compressive as well
as shear stresses.
Rainfall fell to more normal levels as the reservoir level was
reduced to allow the bypass tunnel to be built, and movement of
the entire mountainside stopped. During the ‘second’ filling of the
reservoir, rainfall was normal and measured ground movements
were of the order of 1–2 mm d−1. Although extremely low, con-
tinuing movements suggest ongoing weakening of the clay layers,
probably independently of water conditions. Furthermore, the
development of cracks within, and probably through, the clay
layers must have increased the overall permeability of the mass,
allowing enhanced percolation of groundwater between adjacent
fractured limestone beds. The unstable mass did not accelerate
significantly until another period of exceptional rainfall around
early November 1962, at which point the reservoir may have
impeded drainage of the new perched groundwater to prolong
the existence of raised pore water pressures up-dip of the
reservoir-induced groundwater. The final acceleration during the
‘third filling’, starting in August 1963 and continuing to the failure,
is likely to have involved the same general condition.
As the strength was progressively lost from the clay layers
(Kilburn and Petley 2003), the limestone rock-bridges
(Sturzenegger and Stead 2012) provided more of the mobilised
strength in the final period of acceleration prior to the landslide,
particularly near the eastern margin. Indeed, Delle Rose (2012)
reported Caloi’s (1966) interpretation of seismicity within the
northern slope of Mt. Toc generally migrating eastwards during
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the 1960–63 monitoring period, again consistent with the observed
pattern of movement and with the structural explanation for this.
At some stage, enough of the clay layers had formed shear surfaces
with friction angles reduced to residual (ϕr’ = 8–12°: Tika and
Hutchinson (1999) measured 10°), and enough additional cracks
had formed through previously intact limestone beds, that there
was insufficient strength in the remaining rock-bridges to resist
further movement of the mass. Hence, on 9 October 1963, brittle
failure of limestone beds, particularly those along the eastern
margin, occurred. This led to an extremely rapid loss of strength
from peak (limestone) to residual (montmorillonite-rich clay),
allowing the observed rapid acceleration and large displacement
of over 240 million m3 of rock, effectively as a single unit but with
around 5° of convergence between the west side (360 m displace-
ment) and the east side (460 m, overriding part of the west side
mass near the toe) (Bistacchi et al. 2013).
Several studies suggested that heating of pore water due to the
friction generated by the movement could have reduced ϕr’ fur-
ther and contributed to the acceleration (e.g. Voight and Faust
1982; Nonveiller 1992; Pinyol and Alonso 2010). We agree with
Kilburn and Petley (2003) that this effect is not necessary to
account for the failure characteristics but that we also do not
exclude the possibility that it may have occurred to some degree.
The effects of the displaced water from the reservoir are well
documented elsewhere. Retrogressive development of the heads
of both sides of the landslide occurred following subsidence of the
flood.
Conclusions
The Vaiont landslide was a very large first-time moderately trans-
lational bedding-controlled (dip-slope) landslide that resulted
from the geological consequences of a complex tectonic history
followed by a geologically extremely rapid removal of toe support
due to the Vaiont Gorge being formed. It did not have a ‘chair’-
shaped failure surface. It was probably initiated by the very high
rainfall that happened to coincide with the first reservoir filling
and then developed by progressive failure of thin clay layers. The
progressive failure process was accelerated by subsequent periods
of very high rainfall, the perched groundwater from which could
not easily drain from the slope due to reservoir water. When
enough of the slope had been reduced from peak to residual shear
strength, the remainder failed rapidly and the entire mass was able
to accelerate and achieve the observed displacement within the
estimated 30–45 s.
The key to understanding the Vaiont landslide is the failure surface
geometry, which was controlled by the structural geology. We have
taken new findings from Vaiont by Bistacchi et al. (2013) and synthe-
sised them with the findings of previous studies of the landslide to
provide an explanation of the landslide that is both simple, consistent
with known details and can account for its occurrence and
behaviour—and all of the other contemporary observations and evi-
dence. We used zero pore water pressures as the reference pre-failure
slope condition because if there had been any pore pressures then the
conclusions of our analyses would have been even stronger. Submer-
gence provides the same support to the toe slope whether the failure
surface is ‘chair’-shaped or not, but the pore pressure increase is much
less without a ‘chair’ because the length of affected slip surface and the
mean water table height above it are significantly smaller. Thus, if the
destabilising effect of the pore water pressure on the failure surface is
less than Hendron and Patton (1985) assumed for their analyses using
a ‘chair’ shape, then it reinforces their view (consistent with our own)
that the rainfall was a primary factor in the disaster.
This account demonstrates that there was nothing special about
the Vaiont landslide compared with any other large dip-slope
rockslides except perhaps the juxtaposition of an unusual under-
lying geological structure with a rather spectacular geomorpholog-
ical context. It is to be expected that such features and any
associated risks, including from deep groundwater circulation
patterns, would be more accurately identified from modern site
investigations, largely as a result of what happened at Vaiont. In
other words, it is critical that geologists, geomorphologists and
geotechnical engineers work together to make sure that a ground
model is correct before starting a project. Finally, Vaiont falls
entirely within the scope of current knowledge and can no longer
be disregarded from hazard and risk studies on the grounds of
being a ‘special case’ or otherwise ‘inexplicable’.
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